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OccUpatiODai Safety
Safety and Health (OSH) Act of
The Occupational
1970
safe~y regulation of 5 million
million
1970 provides for safe:y
workplaces. This law is one of the many new types of
workplaces
regulation introduced in the 1970s
1970s to regulate the
nationWIde basis.
basis. A major problem
economy on a nationwide
hintJers policy makers is the effective
effective enforcement
that hinders
Enforcement of the act is the
of such regulation. Enforcement
responsibility
responsibilityof the Oa:~lpationaJ
Oaztpational Safety
Safety Q~
a- i4 Health
Administration (OSHA).
(OSHA).
Previous
Previous research
research has ~ncluded
,uncluded that OSHA has
not exerted
exerted a significant
significant impact on regulated firms.
linns.
Chelius
Chelius (J974)
(1974)and Smith (J97S)
(1975)find
find that OSHA
OSHA has
not exencd
exerted a significant
significant impact on injury rates,
rates, and
Chelius
Chelius concludes that even though injury rates
decreased
decreased after the OSH Act, these decreases
decreases are not
related
related to OSHA but rather to drops in business
business
activity
activityand young worker employment. Gleason and
Barnum H97S)
11975)find
find th~t
thet the costs imposed on firms
firms
for
trivial in 'omparison
*omparisonwith the
for noncompliance are trivial
opportunity costs of investme.,
lS unrelated to the
investmeisrs
correction
correction of violations.
violations. Viscusi
Viscusi(1919)
(1979)concludes that
OSHA
OSHA has failed
failed to exert
exert a significant
significantimpact on the
the
actual
salety investments
investments of firms.
firms.
actual or planned safety
This paper examines the powers
powers of OSHA
OSHA by
by
developing
developing a model of enforcement
enforcement that details
details the
impact OSHA
OSHA can exert
exert on firms
lirms and yields
yields insights
insights
into this
agency's historical
thisagency’s
historicalprogress
progress toward legislated
legislated
goals.
goals. It differs
differsfrom
from previous
previous studies
studies in the following
following
ways.
Yirst,this paper
papr examines
examines the efToctiveness
elfectivenessof
ways. First,

initial
initial and reinspection
reinspection programs whereas
whereas in
in the
the
study oy Gleason and Etamum
Barnum (1973,
(197S~ for example,
example,
only initial inspections
inspections are considered. Second,
Second, this
model confutes
confmes violations to those that are penalized,
penalized.
not total violations.
violations. When a fib-m
fIrm expects
expects with great
certainty to be found in violation but not penalized,
penalized, it
has less
less incentive
incentive to consider correction.
correction. Third, this
paper does not consider the impact of OSHA
OSHA on
injury rates.
rates To the extent that injuries
injuriesare the result
result of
“unsafe” job habits and engineering
engicccring cOlltrois,
controls,
both "unsafe"
OSHA’simpact on injuries
injuries wiU
will likely
likely be insignifIcant
insignificant
OSHA's
since it does not control the job habits of
from zero since
workers.’I Founh,
Fourth, this paper analyzes
analyzesenforcement
enforcementon
workers.
level. One of the characteristic
characteristic
the state and national level.
research is that analysis
analysis of
problems with previous research
aggregate data
enforcement parameters based on aggregate
close theloC
these
does not provide information on how c1"se
values
are
to
the
parameter
values
derived
on
a
state
valutlS
values derived
basis. This paper offers
offers insights
insights into the issue
issue of
basis.
previous research
researchprovides both reliable
reliableand
whether previous
general results.
results.
general
Since the present
present study most closely
closely resembles
resemblesthe
Since
Viscusi (lC"79~
(lq79), a separate and detailed
detailed
study by Viscusi
discussion of the important differences
differencesbetween
betweenthese
these
discussion
is presented here.
here. One difference
differenceis
is that Viscusi
Viscusi
two is
assumes workers
workers desire
desire constant work place
place quality,
quality,
assumC3
result that workers cannot increase
increase
generating the resuit
real wages
wages by increasing
increasing their personal
personal level
level of
their real
control effort.
effort. On the
the contrary, we
we argue
argue that ifif
OSHA exens
exerts a significant
significanteffect
effect on firms,
firms, it causes
causes
OSHA
become more safety-conscious
safety-conscioussince
sinceem
emworkers to become
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INTRODUcnON
INTRODUCIION

cmuaace (1m).
(m77). Only
only recently,
recaltly. and
and
I’ See
seeU.S.
U.S. Department
DcpatmcIlfof Commen:e
VetyrsrrlY.hsVC~~~M~liebkforurrpafeactsbY
very
nrely. have the courts held tinns liable for unsafe acts by
for example,
example, Brennan
Brtwim v.
v. OSHRC
OSHRCand
and Conrad
Conrad
employees. See. for
Precisiollindastries
Precson Indwtrirs (2
(2 OSHC
OSHC(137).
1137).

players would attach relatively higher premiums to
ployers
safety control. In
In addition,
addition. if OSHA
OSHA were
personal safety
incre,lse information
information on risk to workers,
workers.
able to increase
increase both the
OSHA would have the power to increase
OSHA
wages and the costs
costs of
of firms.
firms. The
The opposite
market wages
conclusion is found by Viscusi:
Viscusi: as
as OSHA
OSHA increases
increases the
conclusion
efforts of firms.
firms. workers decrease
decrease their
their level of
control eflorts
personal control. This
This conclusion
cOP-elusion leads
leads Viscusi to the
ahe
personal
following policy consideration:
consideration: there is a danger that
enforcement may increase
increase work
work hazards
stringent enforcement
because ol
01 decreases
decreases in the personal
personal control
control elTortsor
efforts of
because
condu~ion is
is quite different:
different: ilif
workers. 1This
paper's conclusion
his paper’s
workers.
OSHA is
is to increase
increase injury
injury control,
control. it must increase
increase its
OSHA
level of enforcement.
enforcement.
level
difference between
between this paper and
The other major difierence
Viscusi concerns
concerns the testing
testing of the enforcement
enforcement mode!
modd
Viscusi
Viscusi examines
examines the impact
impact ofcertain CY3HA
('SHA penLIt:{
pen"lt:~
Viscusi
Inspection variables
variables on investment
investment in contlc
contll:i
and mspection
firms and worker injury
injury rates.
rates. No
No
equipment by firms
significant relationship
relationship is
is found
found between
between these
these variavaria
sign&ant
bles after
after itit isis recognized
recognized that OSHA’s
OSHA's historical USA
use of
of
bles
enforcement sanctions
sanctions have caused
caused trivial costs
costs to
enfcrcement
firms. This paper recognizes
recognizes that previous studies
studies
firms.
found trivial costs
costs to firms
firms and addresses
addresses the
have found
following questions.
questions. How
How may OSHA
OSHA affect
affect the
following
compliance
compliance of regulated
regulated parties? Has OSHA
OSHA affected
afliicted
certain segments of the nation','
nation’.’ To
To what
what level must

Together the
~he information
information gathering and penalizing
Together
to potential
potential costs
costs to violators.
of agencies lead to
powers of
loss
needed to generate an expected
expected loss
Both activities are needed
out of
of compliance with
with various rules.
rules. For
For
for a firm out
exampk. dIf a regulated
regulated firm expects
expects with
with great
example.
lO be found in violation
violation but not penalized
certainty to
violation. it will
will have less
less incentive to correct the
for a violation,
in
combination. the ~ospecIOSpec
violation.
When
applied
violation.
combination,
tion and penalizing ai Cvities
l;vities determine whether it
"pays" for lirmr
lirm~ to comply with
with rules.
rules.
“pays”
A description of the cost
cost lirnction
function for the firm in
A
some state of noncompliance is
sclole

,h

ci = C(a!, i’,, li, x, pi)

where
where
C', =
c,

EffC\:tive
ElTecliveenforcement
enforcement of Iules
lules relies on both infonna
information gathering
gathering and penalizing
penalizing activities. Information
Information
gathering IS
IS the acquisition
acquisition of information
information on the
compliance decisions of firms.
firms. Searches
Searches may take
many forms:
forms: inspection.
inspection, monitoring activity.
activity, and
complaint information from
from outside parties. The
principal means
meansby which OSHA
OSHA :;athers
g&hers information
on compliance
compliance activity is
is through work place
place inspt..'C..
inspev..
[ions.
l.lons. During
During fiscal
fiscal 1977
1977 OSHA
OSHA conducted
conducted 196.078
196.078
1
inspections.
snspections.’ Penalties
Penalties for
for detectl."<i
detLytL4 violations arl
arc
usually
nenserious ard
an4 serious.
usually of
of two
two types:
types: nonserious
serious. Ead.
Eact
nonserious
nonsenous violation. with a civil pl:nalty
penalty of up to
Sl.OOO.
Sl.WO. has
has a direct relationship to job
ic%bsafety
safety and
health but probably would not I.'ause
cause death or
:.;eriou~;
wiou,, mJury.·\
:nJury.’ A serious
serious violation ~''.irries
r*;irriesa signifi
signilicant
plObability
that
death
or
seriou.'
physical
cant ~2obability
death
seriou.r,physical harm
I:ould
[l.'Sult
and
assumes
the
could wsuft and assumes the cmphyer
empl:)yer knew.
knew, or
clr
l
should
have known of.
of, the
the violation:
viol;ition.”
should have
----~_._----

t*

See
Offtel: of Management
Data
and Statistical Analysis (1977).
kofficeof
Management
DataandStatisticalAnatysis(1977).
OSH
Act (\970,. Sec.
(b),
OSHActtl9701.
Sec. 11
17(b).
•’ OSH
Ad (1970).
(i970). Sec.
!k. 17
OSH Act
17 (b).
(b).
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expected cost
cost in dollars for violation of
expected
i. for i=
i I.
2•.*-a,q
", t1
rule i,
I. 2,

=

"- =

probability that OSHA
OSHA acquired informainforma
probability
" rules
rules
tion on compliance for all q

i', =

violation of rule i,i. for
penalty in dollars for violation
;=
2.....
'/
i= I.
I, 2.
..., ,I

=

percentage of inspections
inspections that penalize
penalize viovio
percentage
lations of rule i. for i == I,
1, 2•...•
2, ..., '/rl

n=

pen.,'cntage
percentageof inspections
inspections that penalize vio
viohnions
lations of at lcast
least one rule

Pi =

cost
cost in dollars assOCiated
associated with continued
violations of rule i. apart from penalties.
penalties,for
i=; I. 2.....
1. ***. 'I.
i"""
‘1.

I.;

sanctions he
be raised to affect compliance
compliance ,,'gnificantly?
.,ignificantly?
El'iFORCEMENT
MODEL
ENFORCEMENT
MODEL

(I)
(1)

The
first four arguments
arguments are called policy parame
parameThe first
ters
ters because
because they represent
represent values
values determined
determined hy
OSHA.
OSHA, which applies
applies its
its discretionary enforcement
enforcement
of noncompli
power to innuence
influence the
the expected
expected c('sts
cc’stscf
noncompliance
parties with individual
individual rules
rules through appli
appliance for parties
policy
parameters.
The
remaining
cations
of
these
these po!icy parameters.
cations
arguments are
are l:allOO
I:dlkd cost
cost parameters
parameters because
because they
they
IT'
~asure all other costs
n7:asure
costs not directly relateti
relate4 to
enforcement.
enforcement.
All four types
types of policy parameters
parameters exert
exert positive
effC\:ts
the expected
expectedcosts
costsof noncompliance for the
the
effectson the
firm.
renects the frequency
lirm. Parameter 0(s1reflects
frequency aspect
aspect of
inspections;
inspections; the
the more
more inspections
inspections cOflducted.
conducted, the
more firms
lirms may
may expect
expect to be
be found
found in violatio:l.
Parameters
Parameters i'i.,j measure
measure one
one aspect
aspect of the
the intensity
character'stic
charactefstic ;1';; inspection,,;
inspections;the
the greater
greater the
the value of
all i'i'
i.,, the greater
greater the
the potential
poteutial cost
cost from
from violation of
rule i.i. Parameter 7l:n represents
representsthe
the rate
rate of penalizing
penalizing all
violations of rules
rules by
by OSHA
OSHA during inspections.
inspections.Both
frequency
intensity characteristics
characteristics are
are alliowed
allowed
frequency and intensity
for.
for. The remaining types
types of policy parameters
parametersare
are the

potential penalties
penalties lirms
finns face for specific
specific violations
violations of
of
potential
rule i observed
observed during
during inspections.
inspections. Values
Values of
of 7,.
I'i
rule
represent the
lhe intensity
intensity characteristics
characteristics of
of penalizing
penalizing
represent
Ai'
activity. while
while frequency
frequency aspects
aspects are
are displayed
displayed in ii.
activity.
Pi represent
represent all
all other
other costs
costs that
Cost parameters pi

The loss
loss function in
in equation
equation (2) de&s
defines the
the
The
facing firms
firms in
in noncompliance
noncompliance in
in aa time
time
expected loss
loss facing
expected
period that
that had
had not
not been
been previously
previously inspected
inspected in
in aa
period

incurred by a firm subject to inspection. While
While
may be incurred
these parameters may represent
represent many diRerent
ditTerent types
these
our discussion
discussion to the impact of
of
of costs,
costs. we confine our
of
wagc:s. Whiie
While workers
workers are
are
workers' wages.
inspection on workers’
considered safety-conscious,
safety-conscious, they do not
not possess
possess
considered
perfect information
information on the various risk characteristics
characteristics
perfect
emple-yments, and market
associated with
with alternative
alternative emplqments.
associated
wages do not
not retlect
reflect perfect
perfect compensation for occupoccup
wages
OSHA may
may increase
increase information
information on risk
ational risk. OSHA
ational
to workers through
through its identiIication
identification of noncomplying
noncomplying
firms, which would increase
increase market wages
wages and the
firms,
the degree
degree of
of identifiidentifi
costs of the firm as well. But the
costs

alternative investment the size
size of
Assume there is an altema?ive
OSHA rules
rules
the outlay
outlay necessary
necessary for
for compliance
compliance with OSHA
the

cation depends
depends on
on the
the characteristics
characteristics of
of the
the rule set
cation
that OSHA
OSHA enforces
enforces on
on firms. There
There is evidence
l"vidence that
that
that
not aimed
aimed at disdis
OSHA's enforcement
enforcement program
program is not
OSHA’s
seminating mformation
IOformation on previously
previously unperceived
unperceived
seminating
heen
to workers
workers and
and that
that consequently
consequently it has
has not
not been
risks to
sU<X.'essful .,t
increasing worker’s
worker's compensation
compensation for
successful
i:t increasing
previously UnLvmpensatcd
unl.:ompensated risk.‘’
flsk. 5 Owing
Owing to
to the
the probprob
previously
able trivial
trivial impact
impact on market
market wages exerted
exerted by
OSHA.
OSHA, the
the effect
elfect of all Pi
pi on the costs
costs of noncompli
noncomplito
be
positive
and
ance is assumed
assumed to
positive and constant.
constant.
The
The loss function
function for the
!he regulated
regulated firm is defined
asb
ash
1
~

E(L)==
E(L)

C
L

ry,&fl
:%"ii'j

n

(2)
(2!

ii=
= II

where i =
2, ...,
= 1.
1.2.
. .. '7
q denotes
denoies the comple~e
comple’e set of rules.
This function
function utilizes all the policy
policy parameters
parameters in
equation
equation (I) f')
t3 determine
determine the relevant
relevant charllcteristics
characteristics
of the incentive
incentive structure
structure facing firms for compliance
compliance
with rules. This loss function
function has seven~1
several interesting
interesting
properties
properties regarding
regarding the effectiveness of enforcement
enforcement
activity
activity on the compliance
compliance decisions
decisions of firms. First.
First,
not only
only the ab~olute
absolute le\el
level of penalty
penalty imposition
imposition
defines the expected
expected costs of violations;
violations; the
rhe irequency
irequency
and intensity
characteristics
together
determine
intensity characteristics together determine the
value ofthe
of the loss potential.
potential. Second,firms
Second, firms must be cited
and
ancl penalized
penalized for violations
violations to affect the costs of their
noncompliance.
noncompliance. For
For example, if OSHA
OSI-IA observed,
observed, but
not penalized,
penalized, violations
violations of rule i.i. it "ould
would have a
trivial impact
impact on the preregulatory
preregulatory costs of firms for
not adopting
adopting rule i.i.
,L.%c
See Bolle
Bolk (1977) lIJIdComell
ad Cotnell and Weingasl
Weirqast (1976).
: 1976).
•� A similar
similar function is developed
developed in Gleason and
at@ Barnum
Batnutn \;975).
tl975).
The function in our study. though. confines violations
violattons only to
to tIJo.~e
thtx;e
that have been penalizca.
pedized.

this cost
cost that
that firms weigh
given jurisdiction.
jurisdiction. It is this
given
against the
the returns
returns from alternative investments.
investments.
against

return on this
this alternative
alternative
given period.
period. If the return
in a given
greater than E(L)
E(L) in the
the same
same period,
period, the
investment is greater
investment
firm does not invest
invest in corrective
corrective activity.
activity. But
But ifif E(L)
E(L) is
firm
greater than
than the
the alternative
alternative return,
return, the
the firm does
does
greater
corrective activity.
activity. If a Iirm
firm is inspected
inspected in the
the
invest in corrective
invest
)'i are
are the
the expected
expected costs
costs of
of
policy period,
period, the
the penalties
penalties yi
policy
noncompliance with
with each
each penalized
penalized violation.
violation.
noncompliance

THE ENFORCEMENT
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS
PROGRAMS OF
OF OSHA
OSHA
THE
The Initial
Initial lmpecth
Inspection Program
Program
The
The value
value of
of E(L) is
is estimated
estimated in
in the
the following
following
The
7
Fiscal
1977
is
the
policy
period
within
manner.
manner. ‘I
the policy period within
which
estimates
are
made.
The
probability
of
which estimates are made. The probability of initial
IX is estimated
estimated by dividing
dividing the number
number of
of
inspection (IL
inspection
firms.
initial
inspections
by
the
number
of
regulated
initial inspections by the number
regulated
Initial inspections
inspections are
are inspections
inspections 10
the policy
policy period
period
Initial
in the
that
that are
are not follow-ups of previous
previous inspections
inspections in the
same
same policy
policy period.
period. Violations
Violations are of two
two types:
serious
serious and
and nonserious.
nonserious. The
The percentage
percentage of detected
detected
violations
violations that
that are serious
serious and
and fined is the proxy
proxy for
;.•
d,.' the percentage
percentage of penalized
penalized violations
violations that
that are
are
serious. A similar estimate
estimate is made
made for penalized
penalized
nonserious
nonserious violations
violations .1.A,.
The sum of .1.I,1 and
and .1.1,2 is
2 ' The
unity.
unity. Average
Average penalties
penalties for serious and nonserious
nonserious
violations
violations ).1
1, and A.I,2 are
are estimated
estimated by dividing
(dividing total
total
by
the
number
of
violations
with
penalties.
penalties
penalties
number
violations
The
The percentage
percentage of initial inspections
inspections that
that penalize
penalize
n
is
estimated
by
the
percentage
violations
violations II
estimated
percentage of aU
all
inspections
inspections that penaJi1.e
penalize violations.
violations.
Ideally
Ideally tl ~‘: expected
expected loss in tQuation
equation (2)
(2) would be
be
estimated
estimated on an industry
industry basis since enforcement
enforcement
levels can be expected
expected to be related to risk levels.
levels.
Unfortunately
Unfortunately such data
data are not
not available; rather,
rather.
such estimates
estimates are ma.de
made on both the state
state and
national
national levels.
levels. Table
Table I displays both high and low
values for eat:h
each palameter
parameter on the state level
level and the
st.mdard
deviation
for
each
parameter.
stclndard deviation
parameter. The mean
is
the
national
mean.
From
shown
shown is
national
From Tchchychetrs
Tchch?chelI’s
the
probability
of
drawing a sample
inequality,
inequality,
probability
observation
observation whose value is
is more than,
than 3 standard
standard
7’

All
and
All enforument
enforcemettt
ad comp\iar-:e
compliarre data
data were
wcm obtained
otbtainedfrom
from the
the

Office
office of
of Management
Mttnagement Data
Data and
and Stalisucal
statistical Amdysis
Antrysis I(1:1m).
1977). The
Tke data
data
on
on the
the number
ttutnbfs of
of flnns
ftrms were
were obtained
obtaird from
from the
the ()fflC(:
Dffdd: of
of the
the Presidenl
President
(1973).
(1973).

TABLE 1,
1. Estimates
Estimates of
of Enforcement
Enforcement Parameters
Parameters for
for Fiscal
Fiscal 1977
1977
TABLE
High
High
Value
Value

0.2629
0.2629

Initial in::pection
im:pection P
01
initial
Reinspedon OIR
Reinspec:iona~
Serious penalty
'P~nal ty Y
l' 1
Serious
Nonserious penalty
penalty y2
1'2
Nonserious
Percent serious
serious.\1
Percent
At
Percent nonseriousA2
nonserious.\2
Percerir
Nonco ... nliance Il
n
Nonco,rirrliance
Expected loss ECL
E(L)1
Expected
Expected iossEp7(L1
iossER(L)
Expected

0.7483
0.7483
909.09
909.09
198.18
0.86
0.86
0.99
0.99
0.92
0.92
34.70
34.70
29.84
29.84

deviations away
away from the
the mean
mean is 0.0027.
0.0027. In
In terms of
of
deviations
parameters E(L)
E(LI this corresponds
corresponds to
to aa limit
limit of
of
the loss parameters
- ~12.42
$12.42 to 520.22.
$20.22. These estimates
estimates suggest
suggest that the
likely eniorcement
enforceme:nt impact
impact from
from OSHA
OSHA on
on firms
firms is
is
likely
insignificant from zero. so we argue that the national
insignificant
estimates
Clre both reliable and general.
general. This allows us
us
estimates are
10
l:arfY the rest
res/. of the discussion
discussion in terms
terms of
of the
to carry
eMimatl ).
national estimate
national
During fiscal
jiscal 1977 the initial inspection
inspection rate
rate was
During
3.7.
3.7. estimatcs
estimates applied to approximately
approximately 96 percent
percent of
all firms.
fi.rrns.A fiml
firm that had not been
been initially
initially inspected
inspectedin
fiscal
fiscal 1977
1977 and was in noncompliance could expect
expect a
wst
cost of 53.90
S3.90 for noncompliance.
noncompliance. This implies that an
lO\e!>iment
InvesLmentin correction yielded
yielded a return of $3.90 to
thc
the firm
tirm that had
had not been
been initially
initially inspected.
inspected.In 1974
the
the National
Nattonal Asspciation
Association of
of Manufacturers
Manufacturers surveyed
surveyed
lh
members
as
to
the
size
01
the
investment
neccssary
investment necessary
11smembersas the size ol
to correct
correct all their violations.
violations.”H Average estimates
estimates
ranged
ranged from
from 535.000
S35.00 for
for firms
tirms with 100 or fewer
fewer
employ~
employees to over $4.5
$4.5 million for
for those
those with more
than 5000
5ooO employees.
employees. With the lower estimate
estimate of
535.000.
a return of $3.90
S35,ooO.a
S3.90 was
was associated
associated with a
return of 0.01
0.01 percent
percent on an invl.stment
investment in correction
An alteruative
m
In fiscal
t&al 1977.
1977.An
alternative investment
investment that yield,~d
yield,:da
return of 7 percent.
percent. for
for example.
example, would have
have gene
generated
52.450 in revenue
revenue to the firm.
fum. The data
data in Table
Table
rated S2.4SO
I mdicate
Indicate that firms
firms in
in noncompliance
noncompliance and
and not
mitldl1)
uuttdily mSilt:\.).:d
tns;ti,‘d during
during fiscal
fiscal 1977
1977 were likely to
have chc'scn
correc·
chcsen alternative
alternative investments
investments as long as
ascorrecwere
yielding
noncom~titivc
lion
im'cstmcnts
non Investments
noncompetitive rates
of
return.
of
If
if aa firm
firm was
was inspected
inspected once
once in
in any
any of
of the
the policy
policy
periods.
penalties would become
periods. the
the pen.alties
become the
the expected
expected
for
wsts
costs
for each
each violation cited
cued and
and penalized.
penalized By
By
multiplying
multiplying the
the dverage
dverage number
number of
of violations
violations per
per
mllial
nunal inspection
inspection by
by the
the penalty.
penalty, an
an estimate
estimate of
of the
the
>.

•’ S«
Ses(JCCIIpQIIOflaJ
Lccupnond Haumis
Haads (1974.
( 1374. p.
p. S).
8).

Low
Low
Value
Value

Standard
Standard
Deviation
Deviation

Mean
Mean

0.0063
0.0063
0.050
0.050
121.85
11.79
0.01
0.14
0.14
0.15
0.50
0.76

0.0435
0.0435
0.1535
0.1535
159.37
159.37
30.511
30.5
0.2334
0.2334
0.1100
0.1100
0.2259
0.2259
5.44
5.44
16.14

0.037
0.037
0.190
0.190
291.21
65.75
65.75
0.46
0.46
0.54
0.54
0.49
0.49
3.90
3.90
20.06
20.06

average cost
cost of
of an
an initial
initial inspection
inspection is
is made.
made. This
This cost
cost
average
would have
have applied
applied to
to approximately
approximately 44 percent
percent of
of all
all
would
firms in
in fiscal
fiscal 1977.
1977. The
The average
average number
number of
of serious
serious
tirms
with penalties
penalties per
per initial
initial inspection
inspecti.."\o was
was
violations with
violations
0.19 in fiscal
fiscal 1977;
the
average
number
of
nonserious
0.19
1977;
average
nonserious
\\'ith penalties per initial
initial inspection was
was
violations AGth
044;
the
estimate
of
the
average
costs
of
initial
044,
average costs
initial
was $103.26.
$103.26. The
The imposition
imposition of
of this
this cost
cost
inspections was
inspections
been considered
considered trivial
trivial by firms in this
would have been
category
category faced
faced with the alternative of an investment
investment
unreiated
unrelated to correction. The initial
initial inspection pro
program of OSHA
OSHA had the likely effect
effect of exerti",~
exertim! an
insignificant
insignificant from zero impact on the resource
resource allo
allocation of firms
firms inspected
inspectlxl once
once during fiscal
fiscal 1977
1977 since
since
the initial inspection program prodUced
produced insufficient
insuficient
in':entivcs
ia:entives for increasing
increasing firms'::ontrol
tirms’ control efforts.
efforts.

The
Tire Reinspection
Reinspection Program
Program
OSHA
also enforces
enforces the
the OSH
OSH Act lhrough
through the
the
OSHA also
reinspect
ion of firms
firms previously determined out of
reinspection
compliance.
R(L). the
compliance. An estimate
estimate is
is made of E
E&!-k
the
expected
expected cost
cost of
0Ccontinued noncompliance for
for firms
firms
not reinspected
detected
reinspectedand not correcting
correcting violations
violationsdetected
is
estimated
during initial inspections.
This
cost
inspections.
cost is estimated by
by
redefining
the
policy
parameters
tedefining the
parameters in equation (2)
(2) 10
to
nmespond
correspond to OSHA's
OSHA’s reinspection
reinspection program.
program. The
subscript
subscript R will denote this
this correspondence.
correspondence.
The valucs
I'RI' and
values of ,'RI'
;‘R,,ia,.
nR remain unchanged
and OR
unchanged
['om
C-om their initial
initial counterparts
counterparts ill
irt Table
Table 1.
1.
Unfortunately,
llnfortunately, data
data are
are unavailable to e1itimate
estimate new
new
values
for these
theseparameters
parametersin
in relation te.
to the
the reinspec
reinspecvaluesfor
tion
tion program of
of OSHA.
OSHA. The
The use
useof
of the
the initial
initial values
valuesof
of
the
produces under
underyi and
and Ai
,$ probably
probably prod.:.lces
the parameters
parameters I'i
estimates
estimatesfor
for the
the true
true values
valuesof
of these
theseparameters
parameterssince
since
itit isis likely
likely that
that inspectors
inspectors would
would cite
cite alld
and penalize
penalize
cDntinued
continued violations
violations detected
detected during
during the
the reinspec
reinspections
more
frequently
and
severely
than
(ions more frequently and severely thau those
those de
de-

&ted during the initial
initial inspection.
inspection. The use
use of .1.I,1
tected
produces an underestimate
underestimate of lit
a,, I sir.ce
s&e
probably produc:cs
focuson the
the serious
serious violations of
reinspectionsare
reins~ioDS
are to focus
9
inspecGons9
A2 is
is probably an
Consequently, II
initial inspections.
overestimate of .1.ART
useof 7;
yi probably produces
produces
It 2- The use
overestimate
an undeRStimate
under&mate of}'
ofyItlIi sin«:e
sinceit is
is likely that inspectors
inspectors
propose higher penalties
penalties for c:ontinued
continued violations.
propose
consequence of using
using n
Il as
as a proxy of n
llxIt is
The conseqUClHle
since there are no data
data on the relative
indeterminate since
d3ferencesin complianc:e
compliance rates
ratesbetween
between the two types
types
diO'erences
inspections. StiD
Still the estimates
estimates of E,p..)
E&.) provide
of inspections.
costs of
ofcontinued
continued violations for
information on the costs
firins and indicate whether sufficient
sutlicient incentives
incentives exist
exist
firms
fo: the correction
corn~tion of violations cited
cited and penaiized
penaiized
fo:,
OSHA in the same
same policy period.
period. The
previously by OSHA
probability
of
reinspection
aRisestimated
probability of reinspection 01 It is estimated by dividing
reinspections by the number of initial
the number of reinspections
inspections. The size
size of the standard deviation of
inspections.
E&)RtL) allows us
us to carry out this discussion
discussion on the
E
nntional level.
national
displays the reinspection
reinspectionpolicy parameters
parameters
Table I displays
estimates of E
E&J.~L). The
The percentage
percentage of initial
and the estimates
inspections followed by reinspections
reinspections in fiscal
fiscal 1977
1977
inspections
was 19,
19. implying that roughly I percent
percent of all firms
lirms
was
were reinspected
reinspectedduring
during this year.
year.”
With an estimate
estimate
w::re
I 0 With
$35,tMMfor the necessary
necessaryinvestment in correction,
correction.
of $35,000
a return of $20.06 in liseal
fiscal 1977
1977 is associated
associated with a
r-turn of 0.06 percent
percent on an investment in correction.
correction.
r-:mrn
investment yielding
On the other hand, an alternative investm<:nt
percent fierates
g Aerates$2.450 i:l
i;r revenue
revenue to
a return of 7 percent
fitm. The data in Table 2 indicate that firms
firms that
the fitlll.
were initially
initially inspected
inspectedbut not reinspected
reinspectedwere
were likely
were
have f'ltosen
chosen alternative investments
investments since
siilbz invest
investto haw
ments in correction yielded
yielded noncompetitive rates
rates of
ments
return. The reinspection
effect
reinspection program had the likely effect
of exerting an insignificant from zero impact upon the
resource
firms that were
were initially
initially inin
resource allocations of firms
spected
spected but not reinspected
reinspected during
during this period.
If
If a firm is reinspected,
reinspected, the penalties
penalties}'yR,
Iti become
become the
expected
each violation
violation cited and penalized.
penalized.
expected costs
costs for each
By multiplying
multiplying the average
average number of violations per
reinspection
reinspection by the average
average penalty.
penalty, the cost
cost of
reinspections
reinspections is
is estimated.
estimated. This cost
cost applies to the 1I
percent
experienced reinspections
reinspections in
percent of all firms that experienced
each
each period. Because
Because there are no data on the
thl,~ average
average
number of
of violations
violations and average
average penahies
pena.lties per
reinspection.
initial inspection
inspection estimatfes
estimat'es of the
reinspection, the initial
previous section
section are used.
used. The
The average
average cost
cost of
reinspection
in
fiscal
1977
was
$103.26,
amounting
reinspection fiseal1977 was
amounting to
a return of0.34
percent on an investment in correction
of0.34 percent

*• See PKJ~IXII
Program and Policy Division
Divisioo (1976).
(1976).
10 lbis estimate
escimIIte is
is deriwd
derived by multiplying
multiplying a0 by a~
OR in his
lhis period.
IDlhis

!§?5,OUO
and representing
representing a noncompetitive rate
rate of
of $~~,<XX}
and
the firm.
firm. The reinspection
reinspection program of
return to the
OSHA exerted
exerted an insignificant
insignificant from
from zero
zero impact
impact on
OSHA
resource allocations
allocations of firms
firms reinspected
reinspected once
once
the resource
this period.
period.
during this

A Reare-ion
RegremiottA...
Analysis
of Nonoompliance
Noncomplii
A
ysis of
Regressionanalysis
analysistests
teststhe direction of the
the relation
relationRegression
between noncompliance and the
the employment
employment of
ship between
enforcement parameters
parameters by OSHA.
OSHA. An
An, obviolJS
obvious
enforcement
problem is
is the selection
selection of the appropriate
appropriate definition
prablem
noncomphiance.An extreme
extreme definition would be
be
of noncompliance.
set of standards;
standards;
one or more violations of the entire set
is a zero-one decision
decision and
and probably
noncompliance is
regulated lirm
tirm would be
be determined
determined in non
nonevery regulated
compliance. On the other hand, noncompliance
noncompliance can
can
compliance.
be viewed
viewed as
as a problem
problem of degree,
degree,in which
which degrees
degreesof
be
are dete:,mined
determined by
by the
the vigor of the
Ihe
noncompliance are
enforcement program and noncompliance
noncompliance is
is delined
defined
enforcement
adherence to standards
standards and is
is also
also influenced
in@enced by
by adherence
use n
ll delinatabove
definedabove as
as a
discretionary authority. We use
measure of noncompliance since
since it allow~
allow: OSHA
OSHA to
measure
noncompliance (;ontinuously
continuously and is
is ex
exinterpret noncompliance
pected
to
exhibit
a
relationship
to
its
e~nployment
pected
its e'nployment of
enforcement parameters.
parameters.
enforcement
estimate is
is outained
obtained hy
by ordinar)
ordinar}
The following estimate
leas!-squares using
using data from the 50 states
stdtes in fiscal
fiscal
leasi-squares
1977:
1977:
l-l=0.107+0.839~+0.323a~+0.00+,
+0.002~2
n
= 0.107 + 0.839cr + 0.3230: R + O.OO4}' I +
0.002,' l

(0.977) (2.20)*
(2.203* (1.62)**
(1.62r*

(2.14t'
(2.14)=

(1.56)**
(1.56)+*

(3)
(3)

(t statistic)
R=
=0.23
R l =0.23

=

F(4, 47)
47) = 3.5~.
3.59*.
F(4,

’

abbreviations for each
eadl of the parameters
parameters are
are
The abbreviations
refer to
defined above
above and one and two asterisks
asterisks refer
defined
confi<leJice levels
level!> or
0" 95
95 and
and 90
90 percent.
pelcent, respectively.
respectiv~;y.
conficlelce
Nonl:ompliance
I
j
measures
the:ate
of
noncompli
Noncompliance I I measures the :ate
noncompliis
a
joint
probability
(i.e.,
the
probability
of
ance
tnat
ance that
joint probability (i.e.,
in:'1Ccted and
and being
being penalized,
penalizl::d, given
given
being initially
initially in:.wcted
being
initial inspectiol
inspectiOl 1.
I. All
All the enforcement
enforcement parameters
parameters
initial
noncompliance, which
exert a positive impact on noncompliance,
exer;
reinforces the delinition
definition of noncompliance
noncompliance as
as a
reinforces
enforcement vigor. This implie:s.
implies that in
measure of enforcement
measure
jurisdictions where
where OSHA
OSHA cites
cites aa relatively
relatively high
high
jurisdictions
percentage of
of iirms
timlS for
for noncompliance,
noncompliance, they
they .are
,ue more
more
percentage
rel<1tively high
high use
use of
of econormr:
economu;
apt to
to emplcy
empley aa relatively
apt
enforcement
sanctions. and their employment of enforcement
sanctions.

parameters
parameters is
is in the proper
proper direction, consistent
consistent with
wit’h
the de;inition
dGnition of noncompliance.
noncompliance.
cONirLI.!SION
CONCLUSION

The examination of the OSHA
OSHA enforcement
enforcement program
.... ;essful in
indicates
indicates that OSHA
OSHA has
has not beerl
been H
%L:,2ssful
achieving its goal of increased
increasedwork pl.ace
place vrotectioll.
protection.
Impacts
Impactsfrom roth
both the initial inspectio'n
inspectic‘nand reinspec
reinspec.ion programs
programs on the resource
resource allocations of firms
firms
have likely been
been insignificant from zt'ro.
zero. Analysis of
the data on the national level
level leads
leads to reliable and
general results with
with regard
regard to the e:;timates
ezitimates on the
state level. Although
Although the regression analysis indicates
indicates
that the employment
employment of enforcement
enforcement parameters
parameters is
positively related
related to noncompliance,
noncompliance, the impacts
iimpacts from
the initial
initial inspection
inspection and reinspection
reinspection programs
programs are
too weak to significantly
significantly increase tb<:
thr compliance
compliance of
fIrms.
firms. If
If OSHA
OSHA is to increase the injury
injury control
control
resources or
of firms above
above that
that general::d
generatd in the private
private
market.
market. it must increase the costs oC
of noncompliance
noncompliance
to the point
point of equality
equality with
with the ra~es
rates of return
return on
:tlternative
alternative investments.
investments. As the modei
modei of
of enforcement
enforcement
mdicatcs.
Indicates. lhe
the goal of
of increased work
work place protection
protection
requires
of
requires increases
increases in the
the employment
employment
0f enforcement
e.tlforcement
parameters.
parameters.
Our
Our major
major conclusion
conclusion and tn"l
(aat of previous
previous studies
is
enforcement program
program of OSl-IA
0SH.A has
has nol
not
is that the enforcement
prtXlul:ed
additional
compliance
hy
firms.
pr&uced
compliance
additional
by
Weidenbaum
Weidenhaum and Delina
Deiina (1978)
(1978) find that
that t.he
t.he compli
compliance
costs
resulting
from
OSHA
regulation
were
$3.2
anccresulting from OSHA regulation
hll:i,.m
bG.~n in 1976.
lY76. At
At first this appears as evidence
evidence that
that
OSHA
'.d a significant
OSHA has exerh.
excrttd
significant impaci
impact upon
upon the
compliance
compliance of firms.
firms, but in
m perspective
perspective this compli
compliam~
anon cost averages only
only $640
$640 per investment
investment expendi
expenditure
lute h~
h) each of
of the approximately
approximately 5 million
million firms
lirms
under
regulation by OSHA
OSHA.” I I This
This expenditure
expenditure ap
ap
under regulation
pear~
pears very
berq’small but may
ma) be explained
explained by considering
considering
lhdtlirms
that lirms invested in occupational
occupational injury
injury control
control long
hefore
bcforr the arrival
arrival of OSHA
OSHA. Since pot{:ntial
potential hazards
hazards
1:05t
cost the firm. among
among many
many other
other items.
items, lost produc
producI,I.irm
ion and risk compensation
compensation to workers,
workers, it is in the
intere~t
.nlcrrst of the firm to invest in injury
injury control
control
':4uipmcnl.
1:yuipmcnt. Even without
without OSHA,
OSHA. changes in worker
worker
,,:haracteristics.
l,:haracteristics, firm
film output.
output, production
production methods.
methods, and
depreciation
IJepreciation of existing
existing equipment
equipment would
would generate
2
mestmcnt
nsestment expenditures
expenditures by
b} firms.
firms.”I

Two
Two lirmtations
lirmtations ofthis
of this study
study and
and their
their implications
implications
for
for public
public policy
policy will
will now
now be
be addresr.ed.
addressed. First.
First, the
the
analysis
is
limited
by
the
level
of
the
data
If
OSHA
analysis is limited by the level of the data. If OSHA
lUempts
Ittempts to
to limit
limit their
their enforcement
enforcement etron
effort to
to a
a small
small
gll'Oup
group offirms.
of tinns, it
it is
is possible
possiblefor
for this
this group
group that
that OSHA
OSM
has
has exerted
exerted a
a significant
significant impact
impact upon
upon injury
injury control
control
d4~isions.'
decisions.”J Such
k selected
Such a
a subset
subset of
of firms
firms may
may be
selected
owing
owing to
to their
their relatively
relatively high
high injury
injury rates.
rates. Given
Given its
its
limited
limited budget,
budget, OSHA
OSHA may
may be
be able
able to
to exen
exert a
a
significant
significant impact
impact un
on these
these firms
firms by
by conamtrating
concentrating its
its
enforoement
reso~ on
enforcementresources
on a
a select
sekct group
group of
of them.
them. In
In this
this
case
OSHA
may
be
merely
acting
in
a
rational
case OSHA may be merely acting in a rational
manner
manner to
to make
make the
the best
best use
use of
of its
its limited
limited budget.
budget.
it
is
not
clear
that
it
is
in
the
interest
Second,
Second, it is not clear that it is in the interest of
of society
society
for
for OSHA
OS?&4 to
to increase
increase significantly
significantly the
the costs
costs of
of
noncompliance
noncompliance that
that it
it imposes
imposes Oll
on firms.
firms. At
At the
the
macroeconomic
macroeconomic level
level such
such actions
actions may
may lead
lead to
to
increased product
jncreased
product prices
pricesand
and force
forcecertain
certain firms
firms out
out of
of
business.
business. Such
Such price
price and
and unemployment
unemployment increases
increases
need
need be
be analyzed
analyzed as
as costs
costs to
to society
society of
of regulation
regulation and
and
be
be compared
compared with
with the
the projected
projected benefits
benefits from
from the
the
government
government program.
program.
The
The author
author would
would like
like to
to tlank
tlxmk PaId
Paul B.
B. Downing
Downing and
and the
the
anonymous
anonymousreferees
refereesfor
for helpful
helprUl comments.
comments.
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